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1 INTRODUCTION
Events such as the ‘credit crunch’, ‘bank run’, ‘financial contagion’, ‘flight to quality’ and 
‘systemic risks’ have widely transpired in recent times. One important dimension permeat-
ing these events is the dynamic link between macroeconomic shocks and banks’ behavior. 
Economic crises experienced by five East Asian countries in the late 1990s were accompa-
nied by financial sector problems. The Great Recession of the late 2000s also corresponded 
to heightened solvency risks affecting over- leveraged banks and financial institutions in 
many developed countries.1 In a world of imperfect information, adverse macroeconomic 
shocks could weaken firms’ balance sheets, diminish bank capital and trigger financial 
disintermediation. Positive shocks, on the contrary, could increase firms’ net worth and 
prompt additional bank lending. Understanding the nature of this interaction offers regu-
lators, supervisors, firms and households valuable insights into the process of policymak-
ing, financial intermediation and responding to boom and bust cycles in the economy.
The credit and deposit behaviors of banks can be affected by several types of macro-
economic shocks. These include shocks to the business cycle, domestic monetary policy 
and external risk perception. Prolonged prosperity, according to the financial instability 
hypothesis of Minsky (1986), may induce speculative euphoria and excessive borrowing 
that pushes the economy to the brink of a meltdown. Perceived risk of loans may be 
underestimated by the banks during lending boom periods. Loan quality characteristi-
cally weakens as a result of optimistic risk assessments based on the higher expected value 
of collateral and the current strong economy (Başçı, 2006). This view has been a fertile 
ground for both theoretical and empirical inquiries. For example, Bucher et al. (2013) 
present a model that focuses on the role of business cycle volatility as a potential cause 
for internal and external funding problems of banks. In a downturn, the internal and 
external funding sources are depleted by virtue of low cash flows from existing loans and 
low funding liquidity of new loans. This prompts banks to fuel excessive credit growth in 
good times to strengthen internal funding later during bad times. Banks could also fail if  
loans become too toxic in an economic downturn. Implications from the model suggest 
that the performance of banks can be improved only if  there is a stabilization of the real 
economy. Empirically, Asea and Blomberg (1998) showed that the market for bank loans 
experiences systematic cycles of over and under- lending based on a dataset of 580 US 
banks between 1977and 1993. In contractionary phases of the cycle, risk premiums on 
loans and the probability of collateralization increase, although loan size remains unaf-
fected. During the expansionary phases of the cycle, the premium and the probability of 
collateralization decrease; while loan size increases.
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The pro- cyclical nature of bank lending can be demand driven according to the 
balance sheet channel (broad credit channel) theory (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1995). 
The central tenet is that negative macroeconomic shock erodes firms’ balance sheets and 
households’ net capital positions, reducing their demand for new credit and banks’ will-
ingness to extend loans. The decline in credit forces firms to cut spending and output. 
Hence, negative macroeconomic shocks may be exacerbated if  credit flows are hindered 
(Bernanke et al., 1996). Shock to domestic monetary policy can also influence the credit 
and deposit cycles since banks are used by central banks as the primary channel for mon-
etary policy transmission (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The 
bank lending channel (narrow credit channel) posits that a monetary contraction results 
in the reduction of credit supply that will eventually affect inflation and the business 
cycle. Theory suggests that the bank lending channel is operational if  two key condi-
tions are met. The first condition refers to the inability of banks to fully shield their loan 
portfolios from monetary policy changes. The second condition refers to the existence of 
a substantial group of borrowers that cannot insulate their spending from the reduction 
in bank credit. Large banks, however, may dominate the banking market and reduce the 
pass- through to the policy rate to bank deposit and lending rates (Rummel, 2014).
In a study of 26 Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) 
countries from 1979 to 1999, Bikker and Hu (2002) found that lending is dominated by 
the demand as measured by cyclical variables such as real gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, inflation, unemployment and real money supply.2 Credit rationing during a cycli-
cal downturn is only to a minor extent driven by a shortage of capital, which qualifies the 
bank lending channel hypothesis. While monetary transmission may operate primarily 
through the lending channel in certain countries, there are challenges to the effectiveness 
of this channel in emerging and developing economies owing to the relative small size 
of the formal financial sector, limited competition in the banking sector, high marginal 
lending costs, smaller degree of de facto financial integration with international capital 
markets and poor institutional environment (see Mohanty and Turner, 2008; Mishra and 
Montiel, 2013).
In the wake of globalization and integration of economies, countries now respond to 
common shocks even more rapidly and collectively. The business cycle of a country is 
increasingly subject to international shocks beyond domestic shocks (Erden and Ozkan, 
2014). Investors’ expectation and fear of future market volatility could increase varia-
tions in macroeconomic uncertainty. Such uncertainty could further distort banks’ allo-
cation of loanable funds over and above the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates or 
the limits posed by monetary policymakers’ actions as argued by Baum et al. (2009). The 
authors found that a doubling of macroeconomic uncertainty corresponds to a change 
of 6 percent to 10 percent in the dispersion of banks’ loan- to- asset ratios. More recently, 
Adams- Kane et al. (2015) found that bank liquidity problem and heightened uncertainty 
in international asset prices were the key channels by which the 2007–09 financial crisis 
affected international lending from high- income to developing countries. European 
banks became more sensitive to market conditions during the most severe times of the 
crisis, although this is partly offset by the behavior of US banks.
Research on macroeconomic shocks and bank behavior in emerging economies has 
also gained traction in recent years owing to the rapid growth and internationalization of 
these markets. The fact that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision presently com-
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prises members and observers of central banks from emerging and developing countries 
(for example, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey 
and the United Arab Emirates) demonstrates the increasing significance of emerging 
countries’ financial institutions and regulatory trajectory in maintaining global banking 
system stability. A study based on a sample of 740 commercial banks in 50 emerging 
countries from 1997 to 2008 observed that bank capital buffers and loan default risk are 
negatively correlated with the business cycle. In particular, banks with low market power 
are more inclined to behave in a counter- cyclical way, underscoring the relevance of 
bank competitive behavior in influencing charter values (Saadaoui, 2014). In the case of 
South Africa (1980–2005), Akinboade and Makina (2010) discovered that bank lending 
is strongly dependent on demand factors, namely, coincident indicators (the present state 
of the economy) and changes in money supply. Supply factors such as capital and reserve 
also exert influence on bank lending, but only after a long lag period. Their findings lend 
support to the pro- cyclicality of bank lending in South Africa. Empirical analysis on 
financial market uncertainty in Malaysia suggests that heightened market uncertainty is 
negatively related to output in the long term and may dampen real output, real credit and 
real stock prices (Ibrahim and Shah, 2012).
While the bulk of the literature has been on conventional banks, empirical studies 
on Islamic banks are becoming popular in tandem with the development of the global 
Islamic finance industry. The Islamic finance industry has spanned across more than 70 
jurisdictions with over 600 financial institutions offering a diverse range of services. With 
new growth opportunities and areas currently being explored by industry stakeholders, 
the industry is expected to triple in asset size by 2020, based on recent estimates.3 Islamic 
banks have also demonstrated resilience during the recent global financial crisis. Beck et al. 
(2013) found that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are 
less likely to disintermediate and deleverage during crises. Using a sample of 88 Islamic 
and 422 conventional banks across 22 countries over the time period of 1995–2009,4 they 
found a higher loan–deposit ratio for Islamic banks than for conventional banks and the 
difference increases significantly during local crises, suggesting that Islamic banks cut 
back less on lending than conventional banks (see also Hasan and Dridi, 2011; Farooq 
and Zaheer, 2015). Small Islamic banks have also been found to have relatively lower credit 
and insolvency risks according to Abedifar et al. (2013) based on a sample of 553 banks 
from 24 countries between 1999 and 2009. They show that the loan quality of Islamic 
banks is less responsive to domestic interest rates than conventional banks.
Yet, the growth of the Islamic finance industry is not without challenges and criti-
cisms. Khan and Ahmed (2001) and Sundararajan and Errico (2002) raised concerns 
that Islamic banks typically face additional deposit withdrawal risk because they share 
profit and loss with investment depositors.5 There are also concerns that Islamic banks 
face interest rate risk (Chong and Liu, 2009; Sukmana and Kassim, 2010; Ergeç and 
Arslan, 2013; Saraç and Zeren, 2015). Kassim et al. (2009) revealed that Islamic banks 
are more sensitive to monetary policy changes than its conventional counterparts in a 
dual banking system as in Malaysia. Another related study showed that Bahraini Islamic 
banks are less capable in offsetting the destabilizing effect of monetary policy compared 
to Islamic banks in Malaysia (Yusof et al., 2009). In Pakistan, Islamic banks, which 
are similar in size as small conventional banks, respond to monetary policy shocks as 
large conventional banks (Zaheer et al., 2013).6 The recent Islamic Financial Services 
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Stability Report 2015 reveals that funding of Islamic banks is dominated by deposits. 
Profit- sharing and risk- bearing investment accounts (PSIA) were gradually replaced by 
sale- based fixed profit deposits. By 2013, the share of PSIA went below the 50 percent 
mark. Islamic banks are also confronted with the same risks from maturity mismatches 
as conventional banks.7
Despite the voluminous body of literature on macroeconomic shocks and bank 
behavior, there are limited studies on emerging countries and Islamic banks, both of 
which could offer potential ‘alternative markets’ insights into the subject. Bank behaviors 
differ from one country to another. In countries whose banking systems are safe havens 
for foreign capital, bank credit and deposit behavior could be less reliant on domestic 
economic conditions. Banks’ perception of risk and attitudes towards risk could also 
be influenced by monetary policy and external factors in different ways. To the best of 
our knowledge, this chapter is the first attempt to examine multiple shocks to the credit 
and deposit behaviors of both conventional and Islamic banks. Turkey is a preferred 
choice of study as the Islamic finance industry is set to gain systemic importance based 
on medium- term growth rates and the current domestic Islamic banking presence in the 
country. The Government of Turkey has been firmly supporting the growth of the par-
ticipation finance sector with an aim to expand its market share to 15 percent by 2023 
from 5.1 percent in 2012 (Thomson Reuters, IRTI, CIBAFI, 2014; Islamic Financial 
Services Board, 2015). Turkey also offers an interesting case for analysis since the Turkish 
economy has become more integrated with the global economy over the past three 
decades. In fact, trade integration indicates that Turkish business cycles are closely linked 
with the cycles of European Custom Union members (Erden and Ozkan, 2014).
In addition to domestic business cycle and monetary policy, we also assess the global 
transmission channel for bank credit and deposit using the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), a measurement of the expected volatility of the S&P 
500 that is gaining popularity in banking studies (Adams- Kane et al., 2015). In the 
analysis, panel vector autoregressions (VAR) methodology is adopted as it is designed to 
explicitly address endogeneity problems in a panel- data setting considering the challenge 
in examining links between banks and macroeconomic conditions. Panel- VAR method-
ology distinguishes short- term impacts of each factors based on the impulse- response 
functions from the long- term cumulative impacts of shocks based on variance decom-
positions. The impulse- response functions (IRFs) can capture any delayed impacts on 
(and of) the variables under consideration and control for country- and year- fixed effects.
Our panel- VAR IRFs for both conventional and Islamic banks are generally in line 
with the bank lending channel hypothesis. This finding is in accordance with Başçı et al. 
(2007) who showed that the stable environment resulting from the implementation of 
structural reforms after the 2001 crisis has increased the significance of interest rate and 
credit channels in Turkey. More specifically, we find for both banking types that a mon-
etary contraction leads to significant decline in bank lending and deposits collection. 
Furthermore, we find that VIX shocks have a significantly positive impact on deposits 
for both bank types, but no significant association is found with bank lending. This 
finding is plausibly related to the global financial crisis, in which accommodative poli-
cies and uncertainty in advanced economies have been associated with the resurgence of 
capital flows to developing countries with sound fundamentals (Pradhan et al., 2011). We 
observe a notable difference in bank behavior between Islamic and conventional banks 
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following a business cycle shock. While positive GDP shocks negatively affect conven-
tional bank deposits, Islamic banks tend to attract more deposits. A possible explanation 
for this finding is that Islamic banks and conventional banks, in principle, operate under 
different business models. Since profit- sharing would imply positive returns during boom 
episodes, deposit accounts in Islamic banks become more attractive, whereas conven-
tional bank depositors seek higher rates of return on their savings possibly through other 
non- banking avenues. Therefore, compared to conventional banks, credits from Islamic 
banks are more pro- cyclical.
In the next section, an overview of the Islamic banking sector in Turkey is provided. 
Then, section 3 details the data and empirical approach used in the analysis. Section 4 
presents and discusses the estimation results. Finally, section 5 concludes with a summary 
of the main findings and some final remarks.
2 ISLAMIC BANKS IN TURKEY
The core of government policy reforms to orient the centrally planned economy towards 
a market economy started in the early 1980s. As part of these liberalization reforms under 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal, the enactment of the ‘Special Finance Houses’ decree of 
1983, with the intention of attracting capital from Arab Gulf countries, paved the way 
of interest- free banking in Turkey. In 1985, two major Islamic finance groups entered 
the banking market: Bahrain- based AlBaraka Turk and Saudi- Based Faisal Finance. 
The Kuwaiti- based Kuveyt Turk started its operations in 1989. Initially, Islamic banks 
were labelled ‘special finance houses’ to soothe the sensitivities of Turkey’s secular tradi-
tion. Afterwards, the Islamic banking segment also attracted the interest of domestic 
investors: Anadolu Finance in 1991, Ihlas Finance in 1995 and Asya Finance in 1996. 
Initially, special finance houses were treated shabbily since these institutions were not 
shielded by deposit insurance and, because of their Islamic nature, were not allowed to 
invest in the lucrative government securities market. The collapse of Ihlas Finance House 
in 2001 owing to alleged fraudulent conduct was detrimental to the reputation of Islamic 
banks that were in the process of gaining footprints in the financial system. At the same 
time, the banking sector was hit by Turkey’s worst economic crisis, after an unsuccessful 
attempt to implement an exchange rate- based stabilization schedule at the beginning of 
the 2000s.
Soon after 2002, possibly due to the decisive implementation of banking reforms and 
political stability, investor confidence was restored and inflation and real interest rates 
abated. For most of the past decade, Turkey’s economy enjoyed a respectable success, 
by maintaining a responsible fiscal and monetary policy, lowering the staggering annual 
inflation rate from 100 percent to single digits and registering GDP growth of more than 
45 percent in real terms. The macroeconomic and political stability brought the long 
neglected country to the attention of investors and the country’s strategic geographi-
cal position allowed easy access to customers in Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East and 
North Africa (Thomson Reuters, IRTI, CIBAFI, 2014). After Turkey’s 2000–2001 crisis 
and following the 2007–08 global financial crisis, Turkey adopted structural reforms in 
the financial and banking sectors that included the restructuring, recapitalization and 
closure of banks and the introduction of stronger supervisory controls and international 
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 standards (by means of instituting an independent banking and regulatory agency). In 
2005, following amendments to the banking law, the government created an even level 
playing field for Islamic banks vis- à- vis conventional market players. Islamic banks’ 
status of ‘special finance institutions’ was transformed to ‘participation banks’ and 
Islamic depositors benefited from the same deposit insurance coverage compared to their 
conventional counterparts.
Further structural changes have taken place in the Islamic banking landscape since 
the bankruptcy of Ihlas Finance: the purchase of Faisal Finance by Turkish holding 
company Ülker in 2000 (named as Family Finance) and the subsequent merger between 
Anadolu Finance and Family Finance into a bigger institution under the name of 
Türkiye Finance. As of 2012, Turkey is home to four shariah- compliant banks, rep-
resenting approximately 5 percent of total banking assets in the country. Today, the 
Turkish participation banking industry is shared almost evenly among the four market 
players: Asya Finance, AlBaraka Türk, Kuveyt Türk and Türkiye Finance.8 The list of 
conventional and Islamic banks, together with statistics of key variables, in Turkey at 31 
December 2012 is provided in Table 16A.1 in the Appendix to this chapter.
3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
This study examines how deposits and credits in Islamic and conventional banks in 
Turkey respond to monetary policy shocks, business cycle fluctuations and external 
risk perception. The gross domestic product level, overnight money market rate and 
the VIX index are used as a proxy for business cycle, monetary policy and external risk 
perceptions, respectively. Deposits and credits are aggregate data from individual banks. 
Domestic data are collected from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the 
VIX index is compiled from Bloomberg data stream. VIX is a trademarked ticker symbol 
for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index and is widely tracked 
by academicians and practitioners as a measure for risk appetite in global financial 
markets.
In the analysis, we use VIX index (VIX), gross domestic product level (GDP), over-
night money market rate (IR), aggregate deposit level (DEPOSIT) and total loan amount 
(CREDIT) for the period of the third quarter in 2004 to the fourth quarter in 2012. The 
year 2004 witnessed some important developments. There was a decrease of annual 
change in the consumer price index to single digits after more than 30 years. Investment 
and consumption spending that were deferred following the crisis in 2001 started to rise 
and fueled credit demand in the banking system. Prospects and convergence expectations 
with the European Union also increased credit demand. In addition, political stability 
and the new three- year economic program announced at the end of 2004 facilitated the 
reduction of risk premiums on securities issued in Turkey (Başçı, 2006).
We log- transform gross domestic product (GDP and normalize credits, CREDIT) and 
deposits (DEPOSIT of  each bank with their average assets during the sample period. By 
doing so, we control for bank scale in the responses of deposits and credits. The overnight 
money market rate of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey as the policy rate (IR) 
is proxied by the quarterly averages of overnight lending rates during the sample period. 
Table 16.1 presents descriptive statistics for Islamic banks, conventional banks and the 
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total banking sector. Descriptive statistics show that Islamic banks are more capitalized 
and leveraged than conventional banks during the sample period. This is plausibly reflec-
tive of the remarkable growth of Islamic banking in Turkey from 1 percent to around 6 
percent of market share during the period of study.
We use the panel- VAR methodology to estimate deposit and credit responses to exter-
nal (VIX) and domestic shocks (IR and GDP). This methodology extends the traditional 
VAR approach to a panel data setting and allows the control for bank level heterogeneity. 
We specify our model as follows:
 Xit = G0 + G(L)Xit + F(L)Zit + fi + eit 16.1
where Xit is a vector of stationary endogenous bank specific variables that includes 
CREDIT and DEPOSIT, whereas Zit is a vector of macroeconomic variables that 
includes GDP, IR and VIX. G0 is a vector of constants, whereas G(L) and F(L)are 
matrix polynomials in the lag operator. fi is the fixed effects that represent bank specific 
shocks and eit corresponds to a vector of error terms. The coefficients of the panel- VAR 
system are estimated by the system generalized method of moments (GMM). Instead 
of mean differencing that is commonly used in panels to remove fixed effects, we use 
‘Helmert transformation’ that applies forward mean- differencing to the variables in 
the VAR system. In doing so, lagged dependent variables and regressors can be used as 
Table 16.1 Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Conventional banks
CREDIT 1055 0.419 0.346 0 1.929
DEPOSIT 1055 0.452 0.338 0 1.883
GDP 1055 19.258 0.275 18.765 19.749
IR 1055 11.686 5.801 1.5 21.48
VIX 1055 20.611 9.402 11.03 58.49
Islamic banks
CREDIT 128 0.699 0.419 0.124 1.586
DEPOSIT 128 0.744 0.41 0.164 1.723
GDP 128 19.299 0.263 18.765 19.749
IR 128 10.837 5.536 1.5 17.5
VIX 128 21.444 9.936 11.03 58.49
All banks
CREDIT 1183 0.449 0.365 0 1.929
DEPOSIT 1183 0.483 0.358 0 1.883
GDP 1183 19.262 0.274 18.765 19.749
IR 1183 11.594 5.777 1.5 21.48
VIX 1183 20.701 9.461 11.03 58.49
Note: DEPOSIT and CREDIT are normalized by average assets of each bank. Gross domestic product is 
the log- transformed value of quarterly GDP in thousand Turkish lira (TLs).
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 instruments without violating the orthogonality assumptions (see Arellano and Bover, 
1995, and Love and Zicchino, 2006, for further details).
Regarding the ordering of the variables in the system, we assume that monetary policy 
rate (IR) adjusts simultaneously to the external risk perception (VIX). Since the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, emerging market countries have directly assessed the impact of the 
crisis on their national economies and changed policy rates in function of external risk 
aversion. The crisis, which is captured by the deterioration in VIX, had a negative impact 
on the real economic activities and thus the GDP. Monetary policy shocks affect depos-
its (DEPOSIT) and credits (CREDIT) with a lag. Monetary shocks create opportunity 
costs for depositors and affect their investment decision. When the monetary authority 
changes its policy rate, the incentives for depositors change, prompting a change in bank 
lending behavior. Hence, the swing in deposits influences the subsequent level of credits. 
Since deposits are still the main source of lending in emerging market economies, the 
change in deposit levels can affect the level of credits (Demiralp and Demiralp, 2014). 
Therefore, we represent the ordering of the variables in the panel- VAR system as Xit = 
[VIXt, GDPt, IRt, DEPOSITit, CREDITit,]′.
The main results will be discussed on the impulse response functions of deposit and 
credits. Impulse response functions are obtained by the estimated panel- VAR coefficients. 
The standard errors are calculated by Monte Carlo simulations which are employed for 
generating confidence intervals. Confidence intervals are generated by taking random 
draws of the models’ coefficients, using the estimated coefficients and their variance- 
covariance matrix. We take 500 draws, and the fifth and ninety- fifth percentiles are used 
to construct confidence intervals of the impulse responses. We interpret the impulse 
responses as significant if  the confidence intervals do not contain the zero line, that is, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that impulse responses are zero.
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Before estimating the panel- VAR model, we test for panel unit roots. Table 16.2 repre-
sents the panel unit root test results for the variables used in the regressions. We employ 
Fisher’s panel unit root tests since the test does not need the panel to be balanced. As the 
null hypothesis of the test is non- stationary, the null has to be rejected in order to conduct 
the panel- VAR estimations. The panel unit root test results indicate that all the variables 
are stationary in the panel, thus enabling the panel- VAR estimations.
Figure 16.1 plots the impulse responses of DEPOSIT to positive shocks to VIX, GDP, 
IR, DEPOSIT and CREDIT. The IRFs show the first six periods after the shock with 90 
percent confidence intervals. The results show that the positive shock to VIX (increasing 
risk and uncertainties) has a significantly positive but diminishing impact on the level 
of DEPOSIT in conventional banks in Turkey. This result implies the possible influence 
of ‘search for yield’ and ‘safe haven’ behaviors, whereby risk aversion and historical low 
interest rates in developed markets generally spurred capital flows into emerging market 
economies with better yield prospects, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Choi, 2015). The relative economic and financial stability within Turkey have also pre-
vented capital outflows during volatile global markets.
The impulse responses to a positive GDP shock show that depositors shy away from 
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depositing in a conventional bank. The positive momentum in the economy might have 
created incentives for real sector investment or other lucrative financial investments, 
making deposit accounts less attractive for depositors. In terms of monetary contrac-
tion, we find that deposits have a significantly negative response, which is consistent with 
the bank lending channel hypothesis (Gambacorta, 2005). The response of DEPOSIT 
to itself  is significant and positive, suggesting some persistence in deposit behavior. 
Interestingly, positive credit shocks stimulate significantly to deposit money to banks, 
which suggest that deposits are demand- driven.
Figure 16.2 shows the response of CREDIT in conventional banks to shocks. Credit 
has a positive response to a positive VIX shock although the relationship is insignificant 
contrary to the corresponding result on deposit in Figure 16.1. In terms of a business 
cycle shock, conventional bank lending responded positively and significantly to GDP 
shocks until the fourth quarter. This finding is in line with previous literature which 
shows that banks alter their lending standards depending on the nature of the business 
cycle (Farmer, 1988; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Asea and Blomberg, 1998). The varia-
tion in banking credit is short- lived in response to GDP growth. One suggestive explana-
tion for this finding is that bank- ownership can have a different impact on bank behavior 
depending on the state of the economy. For instance, Bertay (2014) find evidence that 
state- owned banks have lent counter- cyclically, especially after the 2008 crisis, to smooth 
the adverse effects of the crisis on banking activities.9 The credit cycle appears to be sig-
nificantly and negatively associated with monetary policy. This finding is in support for 
the bank lending channel, that is, a negative response of DEPOSIT to the shocks to IR 
reduces the capacity of bank lending. Although insignificant, CREDIT responds posi-
tively to DEPOSIT shocks plausibly due to the steady increase of non- deposit liabilities 
of Turkish conventional banks after 2008.
Figure 16.3 plots the impulse responses of deposits in Islamic banks. One of the 
notable differences vis- à- vis Figure 16.1 is the positive and significant increase in depos-
its’ response to VIX. This is in line with the evidence that Islamic banking sectors are a 
reliable haven during times of global distress as demonstrated in several recent studies 
(Hasan and Dridi, 2011; Beck et al., 2013). The other difference in the impulse responses 
is the pro- cyclical behavior of depositors in Islamic banks. A possible explanation for this 
pro- cyclical behavior can be related to the different business model adopted by Islamic 
banks. Islamic banks operate on profit- loss sharing where the returns or losses are 
Table 16.2 Fisher’s panel unit root test results
Variable Chi- square p- value
CREDIT 103.4226 0.009
DEPOSIT 170.3005 0.000
GDP 240.6838 0.000
IR 224.0227 0.000
VIX 339.6244 0.000
Note: H0: Panels contain unit roots. Ha: Panels are stationary. The estimations assume the process of all the 
variables is a random walk with non- zero drift.
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shared by the bank and depositors at a pre- agreed ratio. Episodes of a positive growth 
in the economy are expected to generate net positive profits that will positively reflect 
on the depositors’ share of return. The expected higher return could therefore create 
more incentives to deposit in Islamic banks. The result also implies that Islamic banking 
can attract wealth (in the form of deposit) better than its conventional counterparts in 
times of economic boom during which firms are more profitable and households have 
higher income. The other responses plotted in Figure 16.3 are basically similar to the 
findings in Figure 16.1. Because of the presence of displaced commercial risk, Islamic 
depositors’ responses to monetary policy shocks are more sensitive in a dual banking 
system. This finding is in line with Kassim et al. (2009) who revealed that Islamic 
banks are more sensitive to monetary policy changes in a dual banking system like 
Malaysia.
Figure 16.4 shows that responses of CREDIT in Islamic banks resemble conventional 
banks in most cases. A notable difference is the positive and significant response of 
CREDIT to GDP shocks. This finding suggests that Islamic banks in Turkey extend 
credit in a pro- cyclical fashion and is related to the response of deposits mentioned 
earlier. Following Islamic principles in the encouragement of savings during surplus 
periods, Islamic banks are expected to lend counter- cyclically to support businesses and 
households at the time when financing is most needed (Ghafar and Ahmad, 2005).10 
However, it is possible that the pro- cyclicality may imply that Islamic banks are more 
linked to real production in the economy. This conjecture warrants further investigation 
in future studies. We also observe that the response of CREDIT to IR shocks is larger 
in magnitude. One possible explanation for this finding lies in the higher sensitivity of 
Islamic depositors to monetary changes as discussed above.
We supplement findings of IRFs with five variable panel- VAR and variance decom-
position results. Table 16.3 summarizes the parameter estimates of a five variable panel- 
VAR model. The parameter estimates of the lagged dependent variable shows the degree 
of persistence. Credits in conventional banks and deposits in Islamic banks show higher 
inertia. The dynamics of credits and deposits show significant correlation with monetary 
policy, business cycle and risk perception in most cases. Policy hikes lead to deposit with-
drawals from both types of banks. Business cycle conditions influence Islamic banks’ 
credit more than conventional credit supply. Interestingly, the business cycle seems to 
exert a diametrically opposite influence to Islamic depositors (0.3668) compared to their 
conventional counterparts (−0.1474). The deposits and credits at both bank types have 
a differing relationship with global risk perception. We may consider that deposit levels 
respond positively to risk aversion and show a tendency toward surges, however Turkish 
banks still wait for markets to calm down to extend credit. This is interesting in a sense 
that the uncertainty arising from the 2008 financial crisis has spurred capital flows into 
certain emerging market countries that are ‘decoupled’ from the instability in developed 
markets.
In Table 16.4, we present variance decompositions which show the percentage of  the 
variation in one variable that is explained by the shock to another variable. Deposits of 
conventional banks, for instance, are almost evenly explained by the variations of  all the 
variables used in the panel- VAR model ten periods ahead. The variance decomposition 
results also corroborate previous findings: variance decompositions of  CREDIT and 
DEPOSIT are significantly explained by variations in risk perception. Nonetheless, 
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VIX and GDP are explained mostly by the variations in themselves indicating that the 
shocks to risk perception and economic activity are mostly exogenous, that is, affect-
ing the variables but being hardly affected by the variables. The evolution of  the vari-
ance decomposition of  GDP suggests that GDP plays a relatively dominant role in the 
determination of  depositors’ and creditors’ behavior in Islamic banks compared to 
Table 16.3 Main results of a five- variable panel- VAR model deposit and credits responses
Response of Response to
VIXt − 1 GDPt − 1 IRt − 1 DEPOSITt − 1 CREDITt − 1
Conventional banks (obs: 970)
DEPOSITt 0.0014
[0.0006]**
−0.1474
[0.0675]***
−0.0067
[0.0014]***
0.3625
[0.1444]**
0.5203
[0.1559]***
CREDITt −0.0003
[0.0003]
0.0342
[0.0328]
−0.0046
[0.0009]***
−0.0619
[0.0847]
0.8787
[0.0799]***
Islamic banks (obs: 120)
DEPOSITt 0.0005
[0.0005]
0.3668
[0.1092]***
−0.0027
[0.0017]*
0.9289
[0.1537]***
−0.2140
[0.1691]
CREDITt −0.0014
[0.0006]**
0.5019
[0.1142]***
−0.0011
[0.0021]
0.3734
[0.1764]**
0.3020
[0.1809]*
Note: A five- variable panel- VAR model is estimated by GMM. Reported numbers show the coefficients of 
regressing the row variables on lags of the column variables for each bank type. Heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation robust standard errors appear in brackets. *Statistically significant at 10 percent level; ** at  
5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level.
Table 16.4 Variance decompositions
Conventional banks
VIX GDP IR DEPOSIT CREDIT
VIX 0.8014 0.0780 0.0110 0.0549 0.0546
GDP 0.0926 0.6107 0.2894 0.0050 0.0023
IR 0.2189 0.2474 0.5160 0.0089 0.0088
DEPOSIT 0.0713 0.0438 0.0891 0.5235 0.2722
CREDIT 0.0242 0.0188 0.1814 0.0253 0.7504
Islamic banks
VIX GDP IR DEPOSIT CREDIT
VIX 0.5448 0.3131 0.0339 0.0923 0.0159
GDP 0.1002 0.6975 0.1990 0.0019 0.0014
IR 0.4351 0.1157 0.4257 0.0196 0.0038
DEPOSIT 0.1599 0.4708 0.2529 0.1063 0.0101
CREDIT 0.1008 0.5650 0.2305 0.0595 0.0442
Note: Percentage of variation in the row variable (ten quarters ahead) is explained by the column variable.
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conventional banks. Monetary policy also influences Islamic banks’ behavior more than 
conventional banks.
5 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study examines bank and depositor behavior to changing macroeconomic condi-
tions, global risk perception and monetary stance in Turkey. We constructed our bank 
sample as Islamic and conventional to disentangle Shariah and conventional based 
banking. We find that the impact of heightened global risk perception have been con-
structive for deposits and credits in Turkey in the last decade. Pervasive risk aversion in 
advanced countries coupled with the search for yield considerations has paved the way 
for huge capital flows to emerging market countries. Turkey, with its solid fundamentals 
and relative resilience after the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, have attracted an 
ample amount of capital internally and externally. We observe a difference in bank behav-
ior between Islamic and conventional banks following a business cycle shock. While 
positive GDP shocks negatively affect conventional bank deposits, Islamic banks tend to 
attract more deposits. The results provide evidence that Islamic bank lending in Turkey is 
more pro- cyclical. Given their community- based priorities, Islamic banks are expected to 
support their customers during ‘bad’ times and reduce excessive financing during ‘good’ 
times. Our findings also support previous research which showed that Islamic banks are 
behaving similarly to their conventional counterparts in their monetary stance.
Some policy implications can be drawn for the development of Islamic banking in 
Turkey. While we have not examined whether the pro- cyclicality of Islamic bank financing 
is detrimental to businesses and households, future studies could investigate the impact 
of counter- cyclical regulatory policy on Islamic bank behavior, and assess whether such a 
policy would have adverse effects on the economy (such as small and medium enterprises, 
project and infrastructure financing). The shift from interest rate based policy and debt 
financing have been echoed by several scholars for years, a subject that gained traction 
particularly since the recent subprime mortgage and Eurozone financial crises. One such 
example is GDP- linked instruments and alternative monetary policy that are in line with 
Islamic risk- sharing principles, the viability of which have been extensively discussed by 
policymakers, regulators, investors and academia. These are important fields of further 
inquiry that should be seriously explored in future studies.
NOTES
 1. Macroeconomic variables, characteristics of the banking sector and structural characteristics of the 
country are robustly correlated with banking sector crises as demonstrated by research such as Demirguc- 
Kunt and Detragiache (2000).
 2. Lending, at over 6 percent GDP growth, is 2.5 times higher than approximately zero GDP growth.
 3. KFH Research Limited in Bank Negara Malaysia MIFC Insights Report on ‘Innovations drive expansion 
of global Islamic finance industry’, 12 June 2014.
 4. Two hundred and nine listed banks across 21 countries from 2005 to 2009 were used to examine impact of 
global financial crisis on stock market performance of banks.
 5. We also refer to Aysan et al. (2015) who verify the presence of depositor discipline in the Turkish Islamic 
banking market.
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 6. There is a small body of literature on Islamic financial instruments for monetary policy and fiscal man-
agement, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article (Sundararajan et al., 1998; Haque and 
Mirakhor, 1999).
 7. The financing- to- deposit ratios of most banks are under 90 percent and short- term asset- liability ratio 
approximately 80 percent of the liabilities payable within 90 days (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2015).
 8. The government’s support to the sector by allowing the largest state- owned bank, Ziraat Bank, to launch 
its first Islamic banking branch in May 2015 is expected to further increase the share of Islamic banking.
 9. There are three state- owned conventional banks in Turkey with sizeable market share.
10. See Chapter Yusuf verses 46–49 of the Quran.
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APPENDIX 16A.1
Table 16A.1 List of conventional and Islamic banks in in Turkey at 31 December 2012
Total  
assets
Total  
loans
Total 
deposits
Total share- 
holders’ 
equity
No.of 
branch
offices
No.of 
emp’ees
Conventional banks
Türkiye İş  
 Bankası A.Ş.
175 444 107 142 105 383 22 719 1250 24 411
T.C. Ziraat  
 Bankası A.Ş.
162 868 71 426 118 966 17 167 1514 23 153
Türkiye Garanti  
 Bankası A.Ş.
160 192 91 824 87 482 21 309 933 17 285
Akbank T.A.Ş. 155 854 87 656 86 105 21 913 962 16 315
Yapı ve Kredi  
 Bankası A.Ş.
122 180 75 769 68 044 16 862 928 14 733
Türkiye Halk  
 Bankası A.Ş.
108 282 65 894 79 974 12 323 821 14 971
Türkiye Vakıflar  
 Bankası T.AO.
104 580 68 133 67 242 11 918 744 13 463
Finans Bank A.Ş. 54 402 36 440 32 922 7325 582 12 060
Denizbank AŞ. 44 198 28 191 26 696 5030 610 10 280
Türk Ekonomi  
 Bankası AŞ.
43 532 29 686 28 727 4806 509 9288
HSBC Bank A.Ş. 25 299 15 422 14 206 3050 338 6170
ING Bank A.Ş. 25 115 18 842 14 430 3072 319 5319
Şekerbank T.AŞ. 14 518 9974 10 138 1825 272 3565
Alternatifbank A.Ş. 7969 5201 4176 569 63 1230
Citibank AŞ. 7420 2987 5172 1028 37 2123
Anadolubank AŞ. 6291 4176 3921 1160 91 2024
Burgan Bank AŞ. 4442 2905 3265 642 60 976
Fibabanka AŞ. 3900 3221 2689 383 28 612
Tekstil Bankası AŞ. 3677 2660 2715 573 44 841
Odea Bank A.Ş. 3634 1732 2517 514 6 396
Turkland Bank A.Ş. 2966 2017 2149 367 27 524
Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş. 2748 736 1030 413 7 272
Deutsche Bank AŞ. 1297 382 431 515 1 105
The Royal Bank of  
  Scotland Plc.
1019 222 469 456 3 95
Turkish Bank AŞ. 956 396 617 166 19 276
Société Générale (SA) 594 395 127 113 16 282
JPMorgan Chase 
  Bank N.A.
429 0 136 279 1 56
Bank Mellat 408 30 210 184 3 57
Portigon AG 271 25 48 172 1 40
Habib Bank Limited 74 31 10 45 1 17
Adabank A.Ş. 50 0 6 43 1 32
Subtotal 1 244 610 733 517 770 005 156 937 10 191 180 971
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Table 16A.1 (continued)
Total  
assets
Total  
loans
Total 
deposits
Total share- 
holders’ 
equity
No.of 
branch
offices
No.of 
emp’ees
Islamic banks
Albaraka Türk 12 328 9075 9225 1218 137 2758
Bank Asya 21 390 16 085 15 742 2349 250 5064
Kuveyt Türk 18 911 11 848 12 755 1684 221 3939
Türkiye Finans 17 617 12 971 11 430 2125 220 3595
Subtotal 70 245 49 980 49 151 7377 828 15 356
Banking sector total 1 314 855 783 497 819 157 164 314 11 019 196 327
Note: Total assets, total loans, total deposits and total shareholders' equity are expressed in Million of TL.
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